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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMMERCB CLAUSE-STATB TAXATION oF INTBRSTATB Am CARRIERs-Plaintiff, an interstate air carrier, was incorporated in
Delaware, and the home port of its planes was in Minnesota. It conducted
regularly scheduled flights in and between twelve states. No landings were
ever made in Delaware. Nebraska, one of the states in which landings were
made by plaintiff, levied an ad valorem tax on a proportion of the Hight equipment of the plaintiff measured by the proportion of the total use of the equipment that was attributable to Nebraska.1 Plaintiff contended that the commerce clause of the United States Constitution precluded Nebraska from
imposing any tax whatever upon such Hight equipment used in interstate
commerce. In an original action for a declaratory judgment, held, the tax
is valid. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization
and Assessment, 157 Neb. 425, 59 N.W. (2d) 746 (1953).2
In view of the Supreme Court's numerous pronouncements that multiple
taxation of tangible personalty employed in interstate commerce is prohibited
by the commerce clause of the Constitution,3 the courts have often been
pre§ented with the problem of determining exactly where such personalty is
subject to taxation, i.e., what constitutes a tax situs for roving personal property?4 When Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania5 was decided, it was
thought that a substantial step had been taken toward establishing a uniform
rule on the matter. In that case, it was held that railroad cars of a company
domiciled in another state were subject to taxation by Pennsylvania to an
extent proportionate to the use made of such cars within Pennsylvania com-

Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §§77-1244 to 77-1250.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of this case on January
4, 1954, in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment,
74 S.Ct. 312.
3 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 72 S.Ct. 309 (1952), contains a recent
affirmance of this rule.
4 See generally on tax situs of personal property: 123 A.L.R. 179 (1939); 139 A.L.R.
1463 (1942); 153 A.L.R. 270 (1944).
5141 U.S. 18, 11 S.Ct. 876 (1891).
1
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pared to the total use of the cars within and without that state. The Court
abandoned the old rule that personalty was taxable only at the domicile of the
owner, and announced the adoption of a new rule which would sanction
proportionate taxation by those jurisdictions which provided protection and
benefits to the owner, in his capacity as owner, and in which the personalty
appeared regularly. Although the Pullman case has been followed closely in
succeeding railroad cases,6 the majority of the Supreme Court, in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. 11. Minnesota, 7 gave it a construction which has served to raise
new doubts as to the scope of the taxing power of non-domiciliary states. In
the Northwest case, it was held that airplanes £lying on regularly scheduled
£lights in interstate commerce had not been shown to have acquired a taxable
situs elsewhere than in Minnesota, which was the "home port" and domicile
of the owner.8 The vagueness of the Court on this point leaves it uncertain,
however, as to whether it was thought that the Pullman decision is inapplicable
to airlines cases, or whether the tests satisfactory to create a non-domiciliary
taxing situs, as set forth in the Pullman case, had not been met. In the
principal case, it was found that Nebraska had acquired authority to levy the
proportional tax by virtue of the presence of plaintiff's planes in the state at
regular intervals.9 This would seem to be consistent with the Pullman decision, but in apparent conflict with the Northwest decision.10 The latter
decision indicates that the Supreme Court is not entirely content with the
idea that personalty should be taxed proportionately by the states in which
it is used. The trend of recent decisions, nevertheless, is toward sustaining
the proportional tax of non-domiciliary, non-home port states. In several decisions rendered subsequent to the Northwest case, the Supreme Court has
either sanctioned the proportional tax11 or declared invalid the tax of a
domiciliary-home port state which has been levied upon the total value of
such moving personalty.12 Although these decisions have not involved aircraft, the language employed by the Court is indicative of a willingness to
treat the various types of interstate transportation on the same constitutional
footing. 18 The principal case presents an opportunity for the Court to begin
6 Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 54
S.Ct. 152 (1933).
7 322 U.S. 292, 64 S.Ct. 950 (1944).
8 Four justices entertained this view. Since Justice Black concurred on separate
grounds, it became the deciding view.
O On the negative side, the court concluded that no other state could tax the full value
of the planes.
10 The existence or non-existence of a tax situs in states other than Minnesota was
not directly decided in the Northwest case, but evidence showing regular scheduled landings
in these other states was held to fail to establish the existence of a tax situs in those states.
11 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 69 S.Ct. 432 (1949); Smoot
Sand and Gravel Corp. v. District of Columbia, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 505, cert.
den. 337 U.S. 939, 69 S.Ct. 1515 (1949).
12 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, note 3 supra.
13 "We can see no reason which should put water transportation on a different constitutional footing than other interstate enterprises." Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,
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a retreat from the Northwest ruling because there is in this case no domiciliary
state that qualifies as a tax situs for the flight equipment.14 Should the
Supreme Court reject the proposition that a non-domiciliary home port state
is the sole tax situs for airplanes, the persuasiveness of the Northwest decision
would be diminished considerably. Since in that event proportionate taxation
would be permitted either (I) when another state into which the vehicles
travel is the domiciliary state,15 or (2) when another state is the non-domiciliary
home port state, there would be little logical justification for making an exception when the domicile and the site of the home port happen to coincide.
The possibility remains, of course, that the Court will incline in precisely the
opposite direction, holding that the home port state, whether it be the domicile
of the owner or not, is alone empowered to tax the roving personalty.16
Should the latter course be adopted, the entire doctrine of proportional taxation of "rolling stock" would probably be drawn into question. This would
indeed be unfortunate. The reasonableness of the doctrine is too well establisµed to warrant a reversal in favor of ''home port" states.17
Robert B. Olsen

note 11 supra, at 175. When a case involving one form of transportation is being decided,
previous decisions involving other forms of transportation are invariably relied upon as
precedents.
14 Since none of the planes involved land in Delaware, that state is precluded from
taxing them. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct. 36
(1905).
15 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, note 5 supra; Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
note 3 supra.
16 See Justice Jackso.n's concurring opinion in the Northwest case, note 7 supra, in
which he advocates the adoption of this rule.
17 For a novel application of the ''home port" doctrine, see Chicago v. Willett Co.,
344 U.S. 574, 73 S.Ct. 460 (1953), where it was employed to sustain a city license tax on
interstate motor carriers.

